Showing 1 - 10 of 679
Institutions are important for proper economic performance, but are replaceable by trust or other social norms. We show … that when proper institutions and trust are missing, integrity of the individuals can replace them. We construct a model of … a transactions-based economy with contracts preceding the transactions, and show that any one of (1) institutions, (2 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265978
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352382
social capital; then, social capital determines the level of corruption; finally, corruption affects economic performance. We … test this hypothesis on a dataset of Italian provinces, and address the possible endogeneity of corruption by applying an … IV model. We use three sets of historical instruments for corruption: 1) foreign dominations in 16th-17th century, 2 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293919
The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012141081
Every government that controls an exhaustible resource must decide whether to exploit it or to conserve and thereby let the subsequent government decide whether to exploit or conserve. This paper develops a theory of this situation and shows when a small probability that some future government...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012214194
This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435767
Firms often try to influence individuals that, like regulators, are tasked with advising or deciding on behalf of a third party. In a dynamic regulatory setting, we show that a firm may prefer to capture regulators through the promise of a lucrative future job opportunity (i.e., the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012582031
In this paper we show that we can replace the assumption of constant discount rate in the onesector optimal growth model with the assumption of decreasing marginal impatience without losing major properties of the model. In particular, we show that the steady state exists, is unique, and has a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261104
Baltic countries, which opted for a fast and profound transformation of their institutions including business climates … during transition rises in countries where reforming institutions is particularly costly. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273819
The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264274