We show that an insight from taxation theory allows identification of both the supply and demand elasticities with only one instrument. Ramsey (1928) and subsequent models of taxation assume that a tax levied on the demand side only affects demand through the price after taxation....

The public finance literature demonstrates the equivalence between consumption and labor income (wage) taxes. We construct an environment in which individuals make real labor-leisure choices and spend their earned income on real goods. We use this experimental framework to test whether a labor...

We develop a theory of social planning with a concern for economic coercion, which we define as the difference between consumers' actual utility, and the counterfactual utility they expect to obtain if they were able to set policy themselves. Reasons to limit economic coercion include protecting...

The value-added tax is one of the most important tax revenue sources in many countries. However, it is sometimes considered unfair as it ultimately hits consumption, and poorer households spend a greater share of their income on consumption. But this depends on whether, and to what degree, the...

The value-added tax is one of the most important tax revenue sources in many countries. However, it is sometimes considered unfair as it ultimately hits consumption, and poorer households spend a greater share of their income on consumption. But this depends on whether, and to what degree, the...

To help first- or second-year graduate students in economics apply their theoretical training, this paper shows how to solve a simple and intuitive computable general equilibrium (CGE) model using a calculator. Because this simplified Harberger model uses Cobb Douglas functional forms for...

This paper studies the design of tax systems that implement a planner's second-best allocation in a market economy. An example shows that the widely used Mirrleesian (1976) tax system cannot implement all incentive-compatible allocations. Hammond's (1979) principle of taxation proves that any...

We characterize the second-best allocation in a Mirrleesian optimal tax model where agents differ in multiple dimensions and the planner can tax multiple goods non-linearly. We develop a new method that allows us to solve the partial differential equations that describe the optimum regardless of...