Showing 1 - 10 of 68
This paper examines the usefulness of Kalai (2020)’s measure of the viability of Nash equilibrium. We experimentally study a class of participation games, which differ in the number of players, the success threshold, and the payoff to not participating. We find that Kalai’s measure captures...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077192
Whether or not to vaccinate one’s child is a decision that a parent may approach in several ways. The vaccination game, in which parents must choose whether to vaccinate a child against a disease, is one with positive externalities (herd immunity). In some societies, not vaccinating is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013308109
We characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium of a tug-of-war without exogenous noise, in which players have the opportunity to engage in a sequence of battles in an attempt to win the war. Each battle is an all-pay auction in which the player expending the greater resources wins. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274454
deterrence studies published between 1975 and 2011. The profession of the author turns out to be the only statistically … significant explanatory variable: Economists claim significantly more often to have found a significant deterrence effect than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292711
This paper analyzes the implications of potential offenders caring about their relative status. We establish that subjects' status concerns can result in multiple-equilibrium crime rates and may modify the standard comparative-statics results regarding how the crime rate changes in response to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293986
An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the implementability of monitoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352428
In order to analyze the severity of sentencing, and to show how the probabilistic interpretation of strategic behavior can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any attempts to increase the severity of punishment will...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011555554
threshold of legality is uncertain. I show that this legal uncertainty raises welfare. Legal uncertainty changes deterrence in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584863
Research in criminology has shown that the perceived risk of apprehension often differs substantially from the true level. To account for this insight, we extend the standard economic model of law enforcement (Becker, 1968) by considering two types of offenders, sophisticates and naïves. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011887366
In the course of history, a large number of politicians have been assassinated. Rational choice hypotheses are developed and tested using panel data covering more than 100 countries over a period of 20 years. Several strategies, in addition to security measures, are shown to significantly reduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264506