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Delegation of Regulation
Kundu, Tapas; Nilssen, Tore - 2017
We develop a model to discuss a government’s incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The …-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts … implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744895
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Asymmetric Yardstick Competition : Traditional Procurement Versus Public-Private Partnerships
Liddo, Giuseppe Di - 2019
traditional procurement (TP) and public-private partnership (PPP). We show that a mixed regime, in which TP is used in one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892139
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Strategic supply function competition with private information
Vives, Xavier - 2008
A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized in a market where firms have private information about their uncertain costs. It is found that with supply function competition, and in contrast to Bayesian Cournot competition, competitiveness is affected by the parameters of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264447
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A large-market rational expectations equilibrium model
Vives, Xavier - 2011
This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274759
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Loans, insurance and failures in the credit market for students
Del Rey, Elena; Verheyden, Bertrand - 2011
In the education literature, it is generally acknowledged that both credit and insurance for students are rationed. In order to provide a rationale for these observations, we present a model with perfectly competitive banks and risk averse students who have private information on their ability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274775
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Strategic supply function competition with private information
Vives, Xavier - 2009
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276986
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Optimal income taxation with endogenous participation and search unemployment
Lehmann, Etienne; Parmentier, Alexis; van der Linden, Bruno - 2011
We characterize optimal redistributive taxation when individuals are heterogeneous in their skills and their values of non-market activities. Search-matching frictions on the labor markets create unemployment. Wages, labor demand and participation are endogenous. Average tax rates are increasing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277043
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Wage dispersion and labor turnover with adverse selection
Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos; Kaas, Leo - 2011
We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277406
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Signing distortions in optimal tax and other adverse selection problems with random participation
Jacquet, Laurence; Lehmann, Etienne; Van der Linden, Bruno - 2012
We develop a methodology to sign output distortions in the random participation framework. We apply our method to monopoly nonlinear pricing problem, to the regulatory monopoly problem and mainly to the optimal income tax problem. In the latter framework, individuals are heterogeneous across two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281803
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Intra-generational externalities and inter-generational transfers
Kolmar, Martin; Meier, Volker - 2005
In an environment with asymmetric information the implementation of a first-best efficient Clarke-Groves-Vickrey (D?Aspremont-Gérard-Varet) mechanism may not be feasible if it has to be self-financing. By using intergenerational transfers, the arising budget deficit can generally be covered in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261164