transactions. While it involves updating the ledger through a decentralized consensus on the unique truth, the robustness of the … equilibrium that supports this consensus depends on who has access to the ledger and how it can be updated. To find the optimal … decentralization, security (i.e. a robust consensus), and scale (the efficient volume of transactions). Using a global game analysis of …

We propose the concept of level r consensus as a useful property of a preference profile which considerably enhances … the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is … shown that if a preference profile exhibits level r consensus around a given preference relation, the associated majority …

loans. This practice has an adverse effect on commercial banks’ monitoring incentives, encouraging the pursuit of private …

This paper extends the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal non-linear income taxation with a monitoring technology that … the joint determination of the non-linear monitoring and tax schedules and the conditions under which these can be … implemented. Monitoring of labor effort reduces the distortions created by income taxation and raises optimal marginal tax rates …

An authority delegates a monitoring task to an agent. It can only observe the number of detected offenders, but neither … the monitoring intensity chosen by the agent nor the resulting level of misbehavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient … condition for the implementability of monitoring policies. Typically, several monitoring intensities give rise to the same …

typical job search monitoring scheme in unemployment insurance (UI) and acknowledges that search effort and requirements are … measured imperfectly. Based on Belgian data, monitoring is found to affect search behavior only weakly, because (i) assessments … were scheduled late and infrequently; (ii) the monitoring technology was not sufficiently precise, (iii) lenient Belgian UI …

gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project … choice. Optimality would require a large ownership stake for monitoring but a small stake for not interfering with managerial …. The large shareholder retains full ownership of the firm but monitoring, and the resulting firing policy, are distorted …

. Finally, as an extension, we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be oversupplied in …