Showing 1 - 10 of 539
Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information threatens this benefit. Despite these threats,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011555542
We analyze vertical product differentiation in a model where a good's quality is unobservable to buyers before purchase, a continuum of quality levels is technologically feasible, and minimum quality is supplied under competitive conditions. After purchase the true quality of the good is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261256
This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication in persuasion games, i.e., games with an informed expert and an uninformed decisionmaker in which the expert's information is certifiable. The first equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273734
We investigate the effect of search frictions on labor market sorting by constructing a model which is in line with recent evidence that employers collect a pool of applicants before interviewing a subset of them. In this environment, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for sorting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013221175
This paper considers the effects of an interim performance evaluation on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Assuming the agents’ outside option to be determined by market beliefs about their type, interim evaluations (a) provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293918
portfolios to investors. We extend the signaling model for single sales of risky assets to portfolio sales. We identify … conditions under which signaling at the portfolio level dominates signaling at the single asset level. In particular, when banks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011615909
In Spence’s (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …’ productivities. We characterize the trade–offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011931933
Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer - the seller - follows from a nontrivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer-induced certification acts as an inspection device,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274805
We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only … unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012657916
up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777605