A national-champions-related industrial policy has become (again) en vogue among European politicians. Against this background, our work orders different types of national champions along the industry lifecycle. Different types of locally bound externalities appear along the lifecycle. In a...

We examine the ways in which political realities shape industrial policy through the lens of modern political economy. We consider two broad “governance constraints”: i) the political forces that shape how industrial policy is chosen and ii) the ways in which state capacity affects...

We develop a method to measure the incidence of monopolistic markup distortions in the global economy. Using semi-parametric formulas, we measure how trade modifies the deadweight loss of markups through two channels: (1) trade-induced change in markup dispersion, and (2) international...

While countries make use of a wide range of policies to attract multinational firms, identifying the effect of such policies is difficult. Combining firm-level data on both the location of these firms’ foreign affiliates and detailed service-specific information from Costa Rica’s investment...

While countries make use of a wide range of policies to attract multinational firms, identifying the effect of such policies is difficult. Combining firm-level data on both the location of these firms’ foreign affiliates and detailed service-specific information from Costa Rica’s investment...

This paper empirically studies the impact of decentralization on foreign aid effectiveness. For this purpose, we examine a commonly used empirical growth model, considering aid modality as well as different measures of political and fiscal decentralization. Our panel estimations reveal that...

This paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed about local needs. At the same...