, competition does not eliminate but rather exacerbates inefficiencies arising from contracting with focused agents. Common contract …

performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that … measurements), the optimal self-enforcing (relational) contract between a principal and a multitasking agent is an index contract …. The weights reflect a trade-off between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficiency of the contract improves …

derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk …

each other. The contract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal …

Trust between parties should drive the negotiation and design of contract: if parties did not trust each others … over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only contract complexity but also the verifiable …

expectations of partners in a JL contract, and shame from falling short of normatively inadequate effort, under public repayment of … large treatment effects and confirms the central roles of guilt and shame. Under private repayment, a JL contract increases … effort by almost 100% relative to an IL contract. Under public repayment, effort levels are comparable under IL and JL …

and make contract choices more responsive to changes in the level of taxation, resulting in a lower optimum income tax …