The paper examines the interaction among taxes on factors income, environmental quality and welfare. We construct a two-country regional block model with capital mobility and crossborder pollution. Pollution in the two countries is simultaneously abated by the private sector, in response to a...

We build a two regions general equilibrium model with cross-border pollution and either international or only inter-regional capital mobility. To control pollution each region uses public pollution abatement and issues either intra-regionally or inter-regionally tradable emission permits. We...

Climate policies vary widely across countries, with some countries imposing stringent emissions policies and others doing very little. When climate policies vary across countries, energy-intensive industries have an incentive to relocate to places with few or no emissions restrictions, an effect...

This paper analyzes the efficient emissions taxation in economies with individuals who are morally motivated to reduce their emissions footprint. They are heterogenous with respect to their morality and their consumption preferences. We distinguish between the concepts of moral and conventional...

We derive the optimal unilateral policy in a general equilibrium model of trade and climate change where one region of the world imposes a climate policy and the rest of the world does not. A climate policy in one region shifts activities—extraction, production, and consumption—in the other...

We analyze how a country pursuing a unilateral climate policy may contribute to a reduction in global CO2 emissions in a cost-effective way. To do so its system of energy taxes and subsidies must account for leakage of emissions from the domestic to the foreign economy. We focus on leakage...

We develop a model of optimal carbon taxation and redistribution taking into account horizontal equity concerns by considering heterogeneous energy efficiencies. By deriving first- and secondbest rules for policy instruments including carbon taxes, transfers and energy subsidies, we then...

We examine how allowing individuals to emigrate to pay lower taxes abroad changes the optimal non-linear income tax scheme in a Mirrleesian economy. An individual emigrates if his domestic utility is less than his utility abroad net of migration costs, utilities and costs both depending on...

We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...

We study the nonlinear taxation of internationally mobile workers in general equilibrium. Contrary to conventional wisdom, in general equilibrium, migration lowers the bottom tax rate but raises the top tax rate, making the optimal tax system more progressive and moving tax rates closer to those...