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Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric - 2006

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273734

How Communication Makes the Difference between a Cartel and Tacit Collusion : A Machine Learning Approach

Andres, Maximilian; Bruttel, Lisa; Friedrichsen, Jana - 2022

This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free …-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit … sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243096

Implementation of communication equilibria by correlated cheap talk: The two-player case

Vida, Péter; Forges, Francoise - 2011

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274917

Rotemberg and Imperfect Common Knowledge : A Solution Algorithm

Šauer, Radek - 2020

This paper develops an algorithm that enables to solve macroeconomic models with Rotemberg pricing and imperfect common knowledge. Under the concept of imperfect common knowledge, Rotemberg pricing requires the solution algorithm to take prices explicitly into account. The state space includes...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841148

Signaling and Employer Learning with Instruments

Aryal, Gaurab - 2020

The social and the private returns to education differ when education can increase productivity, and also be used to signal productivity. We show how instrumental variables can be used to separately identify and estimate the social and private returns to education within the employer learning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012841583

Belief Elicitation : Limiting Truth Telling with Information or Incentives

Danz, David - 2020

Belief elicitation is central to inference on economic decision making. The recently introduced Binarized Scoring Rule (BSR) is heralded for its robustness to individuals holding risk averse preferences and for its superior performance when eliciting beliefs. Consequently, the BSR has become the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012842970

Learning and Information Transmission within Multinational Corporations

Chen, Cheng - 2020

We propose that multinational firms learn about their profitability in a particular market by observing their performance in nearby markets. We first develop a model of firm expectations formation with noisy signals from multiple markets and derive predictions on expectations formation and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012825991

Information, Asymmetric Incentives, or Withholding? Understanding the Self-Enforcement of Value-Added Tax

Waseem, Mazhar - 2019

During the period 1996-2000, the coverage of VAT in Pakistan rose by twenty times in terms of the number of firms in the tax net and by ten times in terms of the volume of transactions subject to it. This paper leverages this staggered introduction of VAT in the country to estimate its...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866312

Optimal Redistribution in the Presence of Signaling

Bastani, Spencer; Blumkin, Tomer; Micheletto, Luca - 2021

We analyze optimal redistribution in the presence of labor market signaling where innate productive ability is not only unobserved by the government, but also by prospective employers. Signaling in both one and two dimensions is considered, where in the latter case firms have an informational...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217555

Asymmetric Information and Differentiated Durable Goods Monopoly : Intra-Period Versus Intertemporal Price Discrimination

Laussel, Didier; Van Long, Ngo; Resende, Joana - 2021

A durable good monopolist faces a continuum of heterogeneous customers who make purchase decisions by comparing present and expected price-quality offers. The monopolist designs a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We consider the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a game...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212257

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