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Welfare Stigma in the Lab: Evidence of Social Signaling
Friedrichsen, Jana; König, Tobias; Schmacker, Renke - 2017
can exclude other explanations for the observed stigma effect. In the experiment, social stigmatization implies a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011698686
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Replicator Evolution of Welfare Stigma: Welfare Fraud vs. Incomplete Take-Up
Itaya, Jun-ichi; Kurita, Kenichi - 2020
the tax-payer resentment view welfare stigma suggested by Besley and Coate (1992). We find multiple stable equilibria in … coexistence of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up is unstable in the model of statistical discrimination view welfare stigma …, but it is stable in the model of the tax-payer resentment view welfare stigma. This difference arises from the different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012314908
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Wage Effects of Employer-Mediated Transfers
Garriga, Santiago; Tortarolo, Dario - 2021
We explore whether the way in which tax credits are disbursed affects the gross wage of workers. We exploit an unusual reform in Argentina that shifted the disbursement responsibility of child benefits from employers to a government agency in a staggered fashion, from 2003 to 2010. Using...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013219073
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Replicator Evolution of Welfare Stigma : Welfare Fraud vs. Incomplete Take-Up
Itaya, Jun-ichi; Kurita, Kenichi - 2021
the tax-payer resentment view welfare stigma suggested by Besley and Coate (1992). We find multiple stable equilibria in … coexistence of welfare fraud and incomplete take-up is unstable in the model of statistical discrimination view welfare stigma …, but it is stable in the model of the tax-payer resentment view welfare stigma. This difference arises from the different …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315183
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Complex Tax Incentives - An Experimental Investigation
Abeler, Johannes; Jäger, Simon - 2013
How does tax complexity affect people's reaction to tax changes? To answer this question, we conduct an experiment in which subjects work for a piece rate and face taxes. One treatment features a simple, the other a complex tax system. The payoff-maximizing effort level and the incentives around...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010312855
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Tax evasion, welfare fraud, and 'the broken windows' effect: An experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands
Lefèbvre, Mathieu; Pestieau, Pierre; Riedl, Arno; … - 2011
In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a 'registered' income, the realization of which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277040
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Impact of Formal Climate Risk Transfer Mechanisms on Risk-Aversion: Empirical Evidence from Rural Ethiopia
Haile, Kaelab K.; Nillesen, Eleonora; Tirivayi, Nyasha - 2019
This study examines the effect of smallholder farmers’ access to a formal climate risk transfer mechanism on their risk preferences. Survey and experimental data were collected from smallholder farmers that have access to weather index-based crop insurance (WICI) in Ethiopia. We use an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012052823
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Impact of Formal Climate Risk Transfer Mechanisms on Risk-Aversion : Empirical Evidence from Rural Ethiopia
Haile, Kaleab K. - 2019
This study examines the effect of smallholder farmers' access to a formal climate risk transfer mechanism on their risk preferences. Survey and experimental data were collected from smallholder farmers that have access to weather index-based crop insurance (WICI) in Ethiopia. We use an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866564
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Social Planning and Economic Coercion
Hintermann, Beat; Rutherford, Thomas F. - 2014
We develop a theory of social planning with a concern for economic coercion, which we define as the difference between consumers' actual utility, and the counterfactual utility they expect to obtain if they were able to set policy themselves. Reasons to limit economic coercion include protecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435764
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Until Taxes Do Us Part: Tax Penalties or Bonuses and the Marriage Decision
Barigozzi, Francesca; Cremer, Helmuth; Roeder, Kerstin - 2017
up. In this signaling game, proposing (or getting married) is costly but can indicate strong love. The striking property … sufficiently large, the signaling mechanism breaks down, and only a pooling equilibrium in which fewer couples get married remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777605