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Enforcement of contribution norms in public good games with heterogeneous populations

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - 2009

Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265993

Public Goods Provision with Rent-Extracting Administrators

Cagala, Tobias; Glogowsky, Ulrich; Grimm, Veronika; … - 2017

-extraction and cooperation shocks trigger short-run adjustments in the agents’ behaviour. However, shocks do not have permanent … effects. This explains the long-run resilience of cooperation to rent extraction. We also show that cooperative attitudes and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011794140

The value of non-binding announcements in public goods experiments : some theory and experimental evidence

Berlemann, Michael; Dittrich, Marcus; Markwardt, Gunther - 2004

In this paper we present three simple theoretical models to explain the influence of the possibility to make non-binding announcements on investment behaviour in public goods settings. Our models build on the idea that voluntary contributions to the supply of a public good might be motivated by...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261099

Public goods provision and sanctioning in privileged groups

Reuben, Ernesto; Riedl, Arno - 2007

In public good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of its members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, their inherent asymmetric nature may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder to accomplish....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264181

Voting on thresholds for public goods: experimental evidence

Rauchdobler, Julian; Sausgruber, Rupert; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2009

Introducing a threshold in the sense of a minimal project size transforms a public goods game with an inefficient equilibrium into a coordination game with a set of Pareto-superior equilibria. Thresholds may therefore improve efficiency in the voluntary provision of public goods. In our one-shot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265971

Sequential versus simultaneous contributions to public goods: experimental evidence

Gächter, Simon; Nosenzo, Daniele; Renner, Elke; … - 2009

We report an experiment comparing sequential and simultaneous contributions to a public good in a quasi-linear two-person setting (Varian, Journal of Public Economics, 1994). Our findings support the theoretical argument that sequential contributions result in lower overall provision than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273783

Culture and cooperation

Gächter, Simon; Herrmann, Benedikt; Thöni, Christian - 2010

-1367), who study cooperation and punishment in sixteen subject pools from six different world cultures (as classified by … cultural background relative to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences in cooperation. We find that culture has a … substantial influence on the extent of cooperation, in addition to individual heterogeneity and group-level differences identified …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273873

Asymmetric obligations

Riedel, Nadine; Schildberg-Hörisch, Hannah - 2011

We use a laboratory experiment to investigate the behavioral effects of obligations that are not backed by binding deterrent incentives. To implement such 'expressive law' we introduce different levels of very weakly incentivized, symmetric and asymmetric minimum contribution levels...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274783

A note on the design of experiments involving public goods

Graves, Philip E. - 2010

Concern about potential free riding in the provision of public goods has a long history. More recently, experimental economists have turned their attention to the conditions under which free riding would be expected to occur. A model of free riding is provided here which demonstrates that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274945

Voting on punishment systems within a heterogeneous group

Noussair, Charles N.; Tan, Fangfang - 2009

We consider a voluntary contributions game, in which players may punish others after contributions are made and observed. The productivity of contributions, as captured in the marginal-per-capita return, differs among individuals, so that there are two types: high and low productivity. Every two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276039

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