We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. We allow for asymmetries in winning … prizes and marginal costs of effort; and we characterize the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered a bribe … by the owner of the other team and (ii) she accepts the bribe. We show that these conditions depend on the ratios of …

more actively in the team-building task …

also render teams’ identity and social-image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a …,700 participants), we vary the salience of team identity, social-image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased … salience of team identity does not improve performance. Social-image motivates mainly the top-performing teams. Additional …

We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games in which a distinguished team member, the team … allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good and can distribute them among team members. These team … exist in work teams. Our results show that the introduction of a team allocator leads to pronounced cooperation in both …