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Can formal contracts help resolving the holdup problem? We address this important question by studying the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer in which the seller can make relation-specific investments in each period. In contrast to previous findings, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277359
-rights theory of the multinational firm rationalizes these effects and their heterogeneity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014346399
We conduct an empirical investigation into the effects of foreign ownership on worker skills using firm-level data from Spain. To control for endogeneity bias due to selection into foreign ownership, we combine a difference-in-differences approach with a propensity score weighting estimator. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892251
We construct a novel data set to show that, between 2003-2020, up to one-fifth of America’s largest firms had a non-financial blockholder or insider as their largest shareholder. Blockholders and insiders tend to be less diversified than institutional investors. Measures of “universal” and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077008
We study the holdup problem in repeated transactions between a seller and a buyer such that the seller makes relation-specific investments in each period. We show that where, under spot transaction, formal contracts have no value because of the cooperative nature of investment, writing a simple...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263968
This paper examines the link between a firm's ownership of productive assets and its choice of foreign-market entry strategy. We find that, controlling for industry- and country-specific characteristics, the most productive firms (i.e., those owning the most assets) will enter through greenfield...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261423
We analyze the optimal ownership, delegation and compensation structures when a manager is hired to run a firm and to gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project choice. Optimality would require a large ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270637
The paper analyzes the optimal structure of the board of directors in a firm with a large shareholder sitting on the board. In a one-tier structure the sole board performs all tasks, while in a two-tier structure the management board is in charge of project selection and the supervisory board is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261334
model of vertical integration in a supplier-producer relationship that is rooted in the property-rights theory to learn …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224089
We analyze the long-term effects of firm break-up and ownership change on corporate performance. Our analysis is based on a unique data set for a large number of Czech firms spanning the period 1996-2005. We employ a propensity score matching procedure to deal with endogeneity problems. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274965