Showing 1 - 10 of 1,105
incentive to deviate from a cartel. We also present conditions for the emergence of a partial cartel, with the capacity … small firm induces a partial conspiracy that is Pareto-dominant. Implications for cartel identification and enforcement are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014264158
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231973
Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals’ incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296722
This paper sheds new light on the role of communication for cartel formation. Using machine learning to evaluate free …-form chat communication among firms in a laboratory experiment, we identify typical communication patterns for both explicit … cartel formation and indirect attempts to collude tacitly. We document that firms are less likely to communicate explicitly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243096
We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third …-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by … the cartel's incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), which links strategically markets that are seemingly unrelated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822505
strengthened if there exist outsiders that gain from cooperative break down. We investigate this in a laboratory experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892045
This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We … show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: desisting a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel … stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274005
We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296270
We analyze spying out a rival’s price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892109
We examine tippy network markets that accommodate price discrimination. The analysis shows that when a mild equilibrium refinement, the monotonicity criterion, is adopted, network competition may have a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium regarding the winner’s identity; the prevailing brand...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013291317