Conducted in a framework which embodies tax-shifting opportunities, risk of losses and possibility of interjurisdictional loss-offset, this paper investigates a reform of multijurisdictional enterprises taxation, a move from Separate Accounting to Formulary Apportionment. Findings are summarised...

In 2001, the European Commission proposed replacing the current system of taxation of multinational companies by the taxation of a consolidated base, computed at the level of all the European entities of a multijurisdictional enterprise, and then distributed for taxation purposes between the...

This paper investigates replacing separate taxation by consolidation and formulary apportionment in a Bottom-up Federation, when a multijurisdictional firm is mobile in various respects. The reform is decided cooperatively by all the jurisdictions or by some of them, while tax rates remain...

In a two-country economy we analyze how tax competition differs from the standard all-Nashian tax competition, if one or both countries are Kantians in Roemer’s sense. Kantians are shown to choose a higher tax rate than Nashians for any given tax rate of the other country, which indicates that...

We consider a world in which countries apply optimal taxes on mobile capital and savings (like in Bucovetsky and Wilson, 1991). Firms and savers may underreport income in order to avoid or evade taxation. We show that, even in the presence of underreporting, the equilibrium under tax competition...

Current policy initiatives taken by the EU and the OECD aim at abolishing preferential corporate tax regimes. This note extends Keen's (2001) analysis of symmetric capital tax competition under preferential (or discriminatory) and non-discriminatory tax regimes to allow for countries of...

We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a second-mover advantage. In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental-standard levels. We introduce this feature to an...

We present a new model of tax induced transfer pricing as an alternative to the oft-used concealment model. Inspired by interviews with practitioners, we consider a large multinational firm which is audited by the tax authority in the high-tax location. When this country adjusts the transfer...

This paper studies corporate tax competition if it is costly to learn some of the elements that determine the effective tax burden. Search cost may, but need not, eliminate the tax competition pressure. The outcome depends on the boundaries of tax rate and tax base choices. Search cost can...

This paper investigates the choice of apportionment factors under a corporate tax system of Formula Apportionment. In contrast to perceived wisdom, we show that the apportionment formula contains both mobile (capital) and immobile (labor) factors if jurisdictions are granted full fiscal autonomy...