also render teams’ identity and social-image concerns salient. We study the effects of tournaments on team performance in a …,700 participants), we vary the salience of team identity, social-image concerns, and whether teams face monetary incentives. Increased … salience of team identity does not improve performance. Social-image motivates mainly the top-performing teams. Additional …

can hold-up, the lower is the implementable degree of peer dependent incentives. In a setting with team effects … complementary tasks and peer pressure, respectively we show that while team-based incentives are optimal if agents are dispensable …, it may be costly, and in fact suboptimal, to provide team incentives once the agents become indispensable …

can hold-up, the lower is the implementable degree of peer dependent incentives. In a setting with team effects … - complementary tasks and peer pressure, respectively - we show that while team-based incentives are optimal if agents are dispensable …, it may be costly, and in fact suboptimal, to provide team incentives once the agents become indispensable. …

one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this … show that social good production more than doubles in the low-incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our …