derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

, competition does not eliminate but rather exacerbates inefficiencies arising from contracting with focused agents. Common contract …

performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that … measurements), the optimal self-enforcing (relational) contract between a principal and a multitasking agent is an index contract …. The weights reflect a trade-off between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficiency of the contract improves …

updates beliefs using Bayes’ rule. An exploitation contract in which the agent is only compensated for his effort if the extra … profit materializes maximizes the principal’s profits. In this optimal contract, the agent's principal-expected compensation …

contracts that facilitate both coordination and adaptation - enable organizations to achieve these ends. In a novel experiment … adapt to exogenous shocks. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that basing a relational contract on general principles … actions that are consistent with what their relational contract prescribes. To investigate whether there is a causal link …

Trust between parties should drive the negotiation and design of contract: if parties did not trust each others … over time, we find that lower trust increases contract completeness. Not only contract complexity but also the verifiable …

Consider a contract over trade in continuous time between two players, according to which one player makes a payment to … adjustment of the contract payment, involving adjustment costs for both players. Players? payoffs from trade under the contract …, as well as from trade under an adjusted contract, are exogenous and stochastic. We consider players? choice of whether …