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Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts
MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2006
incomplete contract. It is shown that the efficiency of these solutions is very sensitive to the characteristics of the good or …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263921
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Attention-Driven Demand for Bonus Contracts
Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus - 2019
, competition does not eliminate but rather exacerbates inefficiencies arising from contracting with focused agents. Common contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890631
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Bank Bonus Pay as a Risk Sharing Contract
Efing, Matthias - 2019
make external financing costly, the optimal contract between shareholders and employees involves some degree of risk …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892088
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Utilities Included : Split Incentives in Commercial Electricity Contracts
Jessoe, Katrina - 2019
This paper quantifies a tenant-side "split incentives" problem that exists when the largest commercial sector customers are on electricity-included property lease contracts causing them to face a marginal electricity price of zero. We use exogenous variation in weather shocks to show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866313
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Tenant Riskiness, Contract Length, and the Term Structure of Commercial Leases
Brueckner, Jan K.; Rosenthal, Stuart S. - 2023
contracts. Theory shows that the possibility of default on a long-term lease generates a risk/lease-length connection. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014263217
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Partnership dissolution, complementarity, and investment incentives
Li, Jianpei; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2004
optimal, incentive-compatible partnership contract that can be implemented by a simple call option, and then analyze the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261076
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Monitoring a common agent : implications for financial contracting
Khalil, Fahad; Martimort, David; Parigi, Bruno Maria - 2005
We study the problem of multiple principals who want to obtain income from a privately informed agent and design their contracts non-cooperatively. Our analysis reveals that the degree of coordination between principals has strong implications for the shapes of contracts and the amount of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261310
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Rules of proof, courts, and incentives
Demougin, Dominique M.; Fluet, Claude - 2007
We analyze the design of legal principles and procedures for court decision-making in civil litigation. The objective is the provision of appropriate incentives for potential tort-feasors to exert care, when evidence about care is imperfect and may be distorted by the parties. Efficiency is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273769
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Relational Contracts and Trust in a High-Tech Industry
Calzolari, Giacomo; Felli, Leonardo; Koenen, Johannes; … - 2021
We study how informal buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry affect procurement. Using unique data from a survey focusing on these, we show that more trust, the belief that the trading partner acts to maintain the mutual relationship, is associated with both higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013323087
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Balanced Scorecards : A Relational Contract Approach
Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2021
performance measures. We show that such an index contract may indeed be optimal if performance measures are non-verifiable so that … measurements), the optimal self-enforcing (relational) contract between a principal and a multitasking agent is an index contract …. The weights reflect a trade-off between distortion and precision for the measures. The efficiency of the contract improves …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013243235