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Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate … for years or even decades. While the literature has presented several determinants of cartel stability, the vast majority …, the communication and internal structures within the cartels as well as their breakup. Our results indicate that cartel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077191
that matches cartel investigations with trade data at the product level. We then estimate the world import price and … quantity effects of antidumping in cartel products. We find that the use of antidumping in cartel industries helps to maintain … higher world import prices and lower quantities during cartel periods, and to induce the establishment of a cartel. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314861
Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals’ incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013296722
where they collude. Predictably, conditional on conviction of one cartel, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus strengthen firms …' incentives to report the remaining cartel. However, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus have an ambiguous impact on firms' incentives … to apply for amnesty in the first place: On the one hand, Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may help to sustain a cartel …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276894
An increasing body of empirical evidence is documenting trends toward rising concentration, profits, and markups in many industries around the world since the 1980s. Two major criticisms of these studies is that concentration and market shares are poorly measured at the national industry level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249649
In several European merger cases competition authorities have demanded that the merging firm auctions off virtual capacity. The buyer of virtual capacity receives an option on an amount of output at a pre-specified price, typically equal to marginal cost. This output is sold in the market in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261290
The unprecedented access of firms to consumer level data not only facilitates more precisely targeted individual pricing but also alters firms' strategic incentives. We show that exclusive access to a list of consumers can provide incentives for a firm to endogenously assume the price leader's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861421
We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing when markets are always covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm’s Lerner index...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314756
Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013177648
Sophisticated collusive compensation schemes such as assigning future market shares or direct transfers are frequently observed in detected cartels. We show formally why these schemes are useful for dampening deviation incentives when colluding firms are temporary asymmetric. The relative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013310765