Electricity transmission redistributes environmental impacts across space. We exploit episodes of high electricity transmission system congestion to explore changes in ambient concentrations of air pollutants in the eastern United States. Reducing electricity system congestion decreases ozone...

Sophisticated collusive compensation schemes such as assigning future market shares or direct transfers are frequently observed in detected cartels. We show formally why these schemes are useful for dampening deviation incentives when colluding firms are temporary asymmetric. The relative...

We propose one of the first dynamic models of the optimal transition from fossil fuels to renewables in electricity generation that takes into account the variability and intermittency of renewable energy as well as storage. This work sheds light on the extent to which variability and...

This paper quantifies a tenant-side "split incentives" problem that exists when the largest commercial sector customers are on electricity-included property lease contracts causing them to face a marginal electricity price of zero. We use exogenous variation in weather shocks to show that the...

This paper studies the effects of capacity market reforms that the U.S. grid operators have undertaken in response to state-level subsidies paid to emission-free electricity generation. We first derive an analytical model of energy-and-capacity markets that allows us to predict the price and...

This paper develops a dynamic programming method when the one-stage deviation principle in the sense of mechanism design literature doesn’t hold. The commonly used dynamic programming method is valid only if the one-stage deviation principle in the sense of mechanism design literature is...

We examine settings - such as litigation, labor relations, or arming and war - in which players first make non-contractible up-front investments to improve their bargaining position and gain advantage for possible future conflict. Bargaining is efficient ex post, but we show that a player may...