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level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players …' resources are use it or lose it" in the sense that any resources which are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited … find that if the level of asymmetry between the players' budgets is below a threshold, then the unique set of equilibrium …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264422
We study a symmetric private value auction with signaling, in which the auction outcome is used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We elicit conditions under which an essentially unique D1 equilibrium bidding function exists in the second-price auction and the English auction....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315051
We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077334
This paper discusses the role of secret versus public reserve prices when bidders’ valuations depend positively on the seller’s private signal. A public reserve price is announced before the auction starts, and a secret reserve price is disclosed after the highest bid has been reached. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013300864
We report results from the first experimental study of round-robin tournaments. In our experiment, we investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fair-ness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293842
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013298366
This paper studies mechanism design with limited commitment where agents have persistent correlated types over the infinite horizon. The mechanism designer now faces the informed-principal problem in addition to usual issues with i.i.d. types. With an infinite horizon and nondurable good, there...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892075
We study strategic investment decisions in multi-stage contests with heterogeneous players. Our theoretical model of a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892111
Many economic and political decisions are the outcome of strategic contests for a given prize. The nature of such … contests can be determined by a designer who is driven by political considerations with a specific political culture. The main … objective of this study is to analyze the effect of political culture and of valuation asymmetry on discrimination between the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274763
If firms compete in all-pay auctions with complete information, silent shareholdings introduce asymmetric externalities into the all-pay auction framework. If the strongest firm owns a large share in the second strongest firm, this may make the strongest firm abstain from bidding. As a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261198