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Fairness, adverse selection, and employment contracts
Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005
extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their … colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening workers with equal productivity but different fairness concerns is … the fraction of fair-minded workers. As a result, fairness might influence the employment contracts of all workers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366541
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Incentives, Self-Selection, and Coordination of Motivated Agents for the Production of Social Goods
Bauer, Kevin; Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand - 2021
We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217557
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Use and abuse of authority : a behavioral foundation of the employment relation
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2012
, inducing them to resist entering into employment contracts. This resistance to employment contracts vanishes if fairness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009685891
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Security bid auctions for agency contracts
Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2012
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents, in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. 'Steeper' securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571056
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Should you allow your agent to become your competitor? : on non-compete agreements in employment contracts
Kräkel, Matthias; Sliwka, Dirk - 2006
We discuss a principal-agent model in which the principal has the opportunity to include a non-compete agreement in the employment contract. We show that not imposing such an agreement can be beneficial for the principal as the possibility to leave the firm generates implicit incentives for the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371071
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The Efficiency Costs of Dividend Taxation with Managerial Firms
Koethenbuerger, Marko - 2015
The paper analyzes the efficiency costs of dividend taxation in an effort-based corporate agency model in which non-verifiable managerial effort enhances taxable profits. We show that investment changes following a rise in dividend taxes might not be sufficient to infer the efficiency cost of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013011653
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Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts
Jun, Byoung - 2014
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of hidden action and hidden information. Securities range from cash to equity and call options. "Steeper" securities are better surplus extractors that narrow the gap between the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060470
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Corporate Deductibility Provisions and Managerial Incentives
Koethenbuerger, Marko - 2014
Using an agency model of firm behavior, the paper analyzes whether the cost of investment should be tax exempt. The findings suggest that, when managers engage in wasteful capital expenditures, welfare may decline if the cost of investment is tax deductible, as commonly advocated. The extent to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060519
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Screening, competition, and job design : economic origins of good jobs
Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2009
In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003935665
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Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems : theory and experimental evidence
Gürtler, Oliver; Harbring, Christine - 2007
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365864