We study a dynamic model with two competing durable goods; one dirty, the other clean. Due to network effects a consumer who adopts the dirty good today will increase the incentive future consumers have to adopt the dirty good. Thus, a consumer who chooses the dirty good, in a sense causes more...

We consider the effects of taxes for competing two-sided platforms. We first detail how a platform passes a tax increase on its prices. Adding price competition, we study next how the tax affects profits. Because of the strategic implications of the cross-side external effects, the tax increase...

We study a dynamic model with two competing durable goods; one dirty, the other clean. Due to network effects a consumer who adopts the dirty good today will increase the incentive future consumers have to adopt the dirty good. Thus, a consumer who chooses the dirty good, in a sense causes more...

Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known textbook result in one-sided markets is that a government may increase a...