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A note on consumer flexibility, data quality and collusion

Hasnas, Irina - 2014

In this note we analyze the sustainability of collusion in a game of repeated interaction where firms can price discriminate among consumers based on two types of customer data. This work is related to Liu and Serfes (2007) and Sapi and Suleymanova (2013). Following Sapi and Suleymanova we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343547

Multimarket Linkages, Cartel Discipline and Trade Costs

Agnosteva, Delina - 2018

. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012926563

Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions

Ghosal, Vivek - 2015

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing … penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013012564

Passive backward acquisitions and downstream collusion

Shekhar, Shiva; Thomes, Tim Paul - 2020

collusive price that is set by the cartel to increase the acquirer's profit from its claim on the upstream margin. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012297609

Fighting Collusion by Permitting Price Discrimination

Helfrich, Magdalena - 2016

We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a model with two firms that may be able to discriminate between two consumer groups. Two cases are analyzed: (i) Best-response symmetries so that profits in the static Nash...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012996205

Optimal Cross-Licensing Arrangements : Collusion Versus Entry Deterrence

Choi, Jay Pil - 2018

This paper analyzes optimal cross-licensing arrangements between incumbent firms in the presence of potential entrants. The optimal cross-licensing royalty rate trades off incentives to sustain a collusive outcome vis-a-vis incentives to deter entry with the threat of patent litigation. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012912373

Algorithmic price recommendations and collusion : experimental evidence

Hunold, Matthias; Werner, Tobias - 2023

This paper investigates the collusive and competitive effects of algorithmic price recommendations on market outcomes. These recommendations are often non-binding and common in many markets, especially on online platforms. We develop a theoretical framework and derive two algorithms that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014442786

Algorithmic and human collusion

Werner, Tobias - 2021

As self-learning pricing algorithms become popular, there are growing concerns among academics and regulators that algorithms could learn to collude tacitly on non-competitive prices and thereby harm competition. I study popular reinforcement learning algorithms and show that they develop...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012661268

Gender and collusion

Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A. - 2022

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012886259

Collusion by algorithm : the role of unobserved actions

Martin, Simon; Rasch, Alexander - 2022

We analyze the effects of better algorithmic demand forecasting on collusive profits. We show that the comparative statics crucially depend on the whether actions are observable. Thus, the optimal antitrust policy needs to take into account the institutional settings of the industry in question....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012990230

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