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on this information. In this paper we study how a signaling mechanism, where each worker can send a signal of interest to … ready to provide information about their preferences for particular employers, and employers value and are prepared to act … one employer, facilitates matches in such markets. We find that introducing a signaling mechanism increases the welfare of …
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By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that...
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We propose a signaling model of student enrollment dynamics based on probabilities of completion of studies, under …
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This paper presents a model in which firms recruit both unemployed and employed workers by posting vacancies. Firms act monopsonistically and set wages to retain their existing workers as well as to attract new ones. The model differs from Burdett and Mortensen (1998) in that its assumptions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759577
This paper develops a dynamic model of mismatch. Workers and jobs are randomly assigned to labor markets. Each labor market clears at each instant but some labor markets have more workers than jobs, hence unemployment, and some have more jobs than workers, hence vacancies. As workers and jobs...
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