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A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877882
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer’s type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010735190
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059473
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060470
Cost overrun is ubiquitous in public procurement. We argue that this can be the result of a constraint optimal award …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012993698
-linear demand curves with quantities as flows (shares/second). Batch auctions clear all asset markets jointly in discrete time …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250116
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011770710
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054012
be decentralized by sellers posting auctions combined with a fee that is paid by (or to) all buyers with whom the seller …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012988409
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders’ payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877664