Showing 1 - 10 of 80
We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade … at a fixed price before an auction. In the “Buy-It-Now” format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price … effects of bargaining power on aggregate outcomes. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity within sellers. Sellers who …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000430
favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the discouragement effect and increase the designer's revenue. We test these predictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986649
unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games of complete information. In this paper, we generalize their … results to contests with incomplete informa tion. Two assumptions are imposed on the information structure. First, the players …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010208517
(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360336
spite extends to the seller. We experimentally test the model predictions by exogenously varying the presence of human …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011456510
Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011471404
Behavioral robustness is essential in mechanism design. Existing papers focus on robustness as captured by dominant strategies. This paper studies the novel concept of externality-robustness, which addresses players' motives to affect other players' monetary payoffs. One example is externalities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389576
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that stigmatization through public exposure causally reduces the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design exogenously varies the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952402
(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054012
Firms often discourage certain categories of individuals from buying their products, in contrast with typical assumptions about profit maximization. This paper provides a potential rationale for such firm behavior: consumers seek to signal that they have "good" moral values to themselves and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012308496