Showing 1 - 10 of 80
We study experimentally the effect of bargaining power in two sequential mechanisms that offer the possibility to trade … at a fixed price before an auction. In the “Buy-It-Now” format, the seller has the bargaining power and offers a price … effects of bargaining power on aggregate outcomes. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity within sellers. Sellers who …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000430
favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the discouragement effect and increase the designer's revenue. We test these predictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986649
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that stigmatization through public exposure causally reduces the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design exogenously varies the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952402
(ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054012
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor … quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given … the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games. Our subjects provide low-quality information even when doing so …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917514
For the procurement of complex goods the early exchange of information is important to avoid costly renegotiation ex … auctions if sellers are likely to have superior information about possible design improvements, if renegotiation is costly, and … if the buyer's bargaining position is sufficiently strong. Moreover, we show that negotiations provide stronger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024680
Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: a public auction or an optimally structured negotiation with a smaller number of bidders? We show that under standard assumptions the public auction is always preferable, even if it forfeits all the seller's negotiating power, including the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013248693
loss for both sides. One implication is informational homophily: a receiver can rationally prefer to obtain information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243362
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on … equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely … reasoning. Stated second order beliefs indicate that subjects underestimate the information contained in public signals about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316251
Choice screen auctions have been recently deployed in 31 European countries, allowing consumers to choose their preferred search engine on Google's Android platform instead of being automatically defaulted to Google's own search engine. I show that a seemingly minor detail in the design of these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014090768