We investigate empirically how party ideology influences size and scope of government as measured by the size of government, tax structure and labor market regulation. Our dataset comprises 49 US states over the 1993-2009 period. We employ the new data on the ideological mapping of US...

This paper investigates the impact of the intensity of political competition on the leviathan behavior by political incumbents. Using panel data from German municipalities, we test whether the relative political strength of parties in local councils influences the spending behavior of...

Social justice is a topic of importance to social scientists and also political decision makers. We examine the relationship between globalization and social justice as measured by a new indicator for 31 OECD countries. The results show that countries that experienced rapid globalization enjoy...

This paper describes the empirical evidence on partisan politics in OECD panel studies. I elaborate on the research designs, the measurement of government ideology and why the empirical studies do not and cannot derive causal effects. Discussing about 100 panel data studies, the results indicate...

Kaum ein Thema im weiten Feld der Politischen Ökonomie ist so populär und zugleich so problembeladen wie das der politischen Konjunkturzyklen. Die theoretische Literatur sieht in der Wahlunsicherheit eine zentrale Einflussgröße. Vorhandene empirische Studien vernachlässigen diesen...

This paper re-examines the link between globalization and income inequality. We use data for 140 countries over the period 1970-2014 and employ an IV approach to deal with the endogeneity of globalization measures. We find that the link between globalization and income inequality differs across...

This paper examines whether the federal structure of aid-receiving countries matters in explaining aid effectiveness. Following the decentralization theorem, the devolution of powers should increase aid effectiveness, since local decision-makers are better informed about local needs. At the same...