When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal …, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because non …

. Finally, as an extension, we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be oversupplied in …

when the agent is protected by limited liability. In this paper, we investigate how the principal should construct the … globally incentive compatible under limited liability, if local incentive constraints are strictly satisfied. We identify …

Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when … acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability …

We focus in this paper on the effects of court errors on the optimal sharing of liability between firms and financiers …, governments and courts we show, through numerical simulations, the distortions in liability sharing between firms and financiers … firm innocent of inappropriate care) errors. This role is considered in a context where liability sharing is already …

financial markets and shareholders can monitor the manager's portfolio in order to keep him from hedging, but monitoring is … performance when the cost of monitoring is higher or when hedging markets are more developed, and (iii) conditional on the firm …'s performance, the manager's compensation is lower when his portfolio is monitored, even if no hedging is revealed by monitoring …