We study the effect of power sharing over income redistribution among different socio-economic groups in a model of redistributive politics with fairness concern. We prove that a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists under fairly general conditions; and we show that equilibrium transfers...

Income inequality is rising but there seems to be no clear-cut effect on redistribution preferences, which is inconsistent with expectations of individual utility maximization. To explain this puzzle, recent research focuses on other-regarding motives. This study follows prior theorization...

We re-analyze the major explanations of redistribution including the Meltzer-Richard (MR) model, power resources theory (PRT), the Iversen-Soskice political institutions explanation, Lupu and Ponstusson's wage inequality skew, along with works suggesting other causes, such as immigration. The...

This paper explores common trends in inequality and redistribution across OECD countries from the late 1980s to 2013. Low‐end inequality rises during economic downturns while rising top‐end inequality is associated with economic growth. Most countries retreated from redistribution from the...

This paper concerns public input provision as an instrument for redistribution under international outsourcing by using a model-economy comprising two countries, North and South, where firms in the North may outsource part of their low-skilled labor intensive production to the South. We consider...

In an overlapping generations model with two social classes, rich and poor, parents of the different social classes vote on two issues: redistributive policies for them and education investment for their children. Public education is the engine for growth through its effect on human capital; but...

This paper develops an open economy model with heterogeneous final goods producers who simultaneously choose whether to export their goods and whether to use imported intermediates. The model highlights mechanisms whereby import policies affect aggregate productivity, resource allocation, and...

This paper analyzes government commitments to ongoing spending programs that require future outlays. Spending commitments are important for understanding partisan politics because they constrain future governments. In a model with one government good, a “stubborn liberal” policy maker can...

We test the hypothesis that the flypaper effect can arise if the recipient government finances part of its expenditures with a distortionary tax. We present a simple theoretical framework that shows how a lump-sum transfer stimulates the marginal expenditures of a recipient government through an...

This paper shows that the fiscal multiplier for purchases of durable and investment goods is very small - much smaller than the multiplier for nondurable goods. Standard models predict small durables multipliers because private sector purchases of durable goods are highly intertemporally...