Showing 1 - 10 of 11
In three-person envy games, an allocator, a responder, and a dummy player interact. Since agreement payoffs of responder and dummy are exogenously given, there is no tradeoff between allocator payoff and the payoffs of responder and dummy. Rather, the allocator chooses the size of the pie and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011186347
This article examines the nature of human behavior in a nested socialdilemma referred to as the Spillover Game. Players are divided into twogroups with positive production interdependencies. Based on theoreticallyderived opportunistic, local, and global optima, our experimental...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022157
Innovation economics is usually neglecting the psychological tradition of creativity research. Our study is an attempt to experimentally collect behavioral data revealing in how far personality characteristics like creativity, analytical skills and personality traits on the one hand and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010981947
Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by out-comes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, whereprocedures are dened independently of an outcome. To that end, wedesign procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry thesame information on other's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022177
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010877980
Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits withoutenforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking andrather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it.[...]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009022159
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism … to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060963
Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315721
Based on the acquiring-a-company game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010981945
This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism … to public projects provision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects’ costs can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010723523