We formulate a dynamic game model of trade in an exhaustible resource with a quantity-setting cartel. We compute the … importing country, and leadership by the exporting cartel. We numerically show that as compared to the Nash equilibrium, both … players are better off if the importing country is the leader. The follower is worse off if the exporting cartel is the leader …

. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are … strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint. Importantly, trade costs affect cartel shipments and welfare not … costs exert a negative and significant effect on cartel discipline. In turn, cartel discipline has a negative and …

While price-fixing cartel prosecutions have received significant attention, the policy determinants and the political ….S. antitrust cartel prosecutions during the period 1969-2013. This period has seen substantive policy innovations with increasing … penalties related to fines and jail terms. There appear to be four distinct cartel policy regimes: pre-1978, 1978-1992, 1993 …

from, individual markets. We show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive …

it is detected. We propose a theory of "equilibrium price cutting and business stealing" in cartels to bridge this gap … between theory and observation …

; this is equivalent to modeling firms as an implicit cartel playing a punishment game. We show that coordination can …