Showing 1 - 5 of 5
This paper analyses the cost implications for climate policy in developed countries if developing countries are unwilling to adopt measures to reduce their own GHG emissions. First, we assume that a 450 CO2 (550 CO2e) ppmv stabilisation target is to be achieved and that Non Annex1 (NA1)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012750000
This paper analyses the incentives to participate in and the stability of international climate coalitions. Using the integrated assessment model WITCH, the analysis of coalitions' profitability and stability is performed under alternative assumptions concerning the pure rate of time preference,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010282963
Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the past unsuccessful attempts, even current negotiations seem to pursue the same...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608380
In this paper an n-player non-co-operative game is used to model countries' decision of whether or not to sign an international agreement on climate change control. The stable coalition structure of the game is defined and then computed for a climate game in which the role of carbon leakage is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608390
In this paper a simple model is used to analyse the strategic behaviour of countries that bargain over CO2 emission reductions. Five main world regions are considered and their incentives to sign an international agreement on climate change control are analysed. A non-cooperative approach to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608392