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unemployment benefits; we find that the MW is preferred by the majority of workers (even when the unemployed receive very generous … unemployment benefits). In the second model, the government engages in redistribution through the public provision of private goods … given generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme, the maximum, politically viable, MW is lower than in the absence of in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951678
In this paper we construct a political economy model in which minimum wages are determined according to the wishes of the median voter. Using the minimum wage scheme as the status quo, we show that the replacement of minimum wages by wage subsidies guaranteeing the same (pre-tax) level of income...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760615
Using an intertemporal model of saving and capital accumulation we demonstrate that it is impossible for any binding minimum wage to increase the after-tax incomes of workers if the production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, or if there are no differences in ability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013052016
Using an intertemporal model of saving and capital accumulation with two types of agents (workers and capitalists) we demonstrate that it is impossible for any binding minimum wage to increase the after-tax incomes of workers if the production function is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012988396
This paper analyzes long run outcomes resulting from adopting a binding minimum wage in a neoclassical model with perfectly competitive labour markets and capital accumulation. The model distinguishes between workers of heterogeneous ability and capitalists who do all the saving, and it entails...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315566