We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks' profitability, while strict supervision reduces the scope of...

Several countries have recently introduced national capital standards exceeding the internationally coordinated Basel III rules, thus suggesting a ‘race to the top' in capital standards. We study regulatory competition when banks are heterogeneous and give loans to firms that produce output in...

During the last decades a consensus has emerged that it is impossible to disentangle liquidity shocks from solvency shocks. As a consequence the classical lender of last resort rules, as defined by Thornton and Bagehot, based on lending to solvent illiquid institutions appear ill-suited to this...

This paper presents a review of the most significant fiscal rules policymakers can choose from. The insights from this review are then applied to the current budgetary situation of the European Union. In the European Union, the supranational Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) should provide the...

An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via two standing facilities: a lending facility and a deposit facility. In this paper we show that it is socially optimal to implement a non-zero interest rate spread. We prove this result in a dynamic general equilibrium model...