Showing 1 - 10 of 12
appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094193
We analyze how agents' present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite-horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract - which agents plan to choose in the future - and a real contract which they end up...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978071
measures of workers’ productivity and trustworthiness and make this information available to potential employers. Our data show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009364733
Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316554
Empirically, compensation systems generate substantial effort despite weak monetary incentives. We consider reciprocal motivations as a source of incentives. We solve for the optimal contract in the basic principal-agent problem and show that reciprocal motivations and explicit performance-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005766075
Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012921301
vary the wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. Furthermore we collect additional information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147790
Employment protection harms early-career employees without benefitting them in later career stages (Leonardi and Pica, 2013). We demonstrate that this pattern can result from employers exploiting na¨ıve present-biased employees. Employers offer a dynamic contract with low early-career wages,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014512416
’s ability to “repay the gift”. We collect information on ability to control for differences and on reciprocal inclination to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009421689
vary the wage and the effect of the worker’s effort on the manager’s payoff. Furthermore we collect additional information …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008533996