Showing 1 - 10 of 54
We provide experimental evidence on the emergence of redistributive societies. Individuals first vote on redistribution by feet and then learn their productivity and invest. We vary the individuals' information about their productivities at the time when they choose a distribution rule and find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013074399
This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small differences in instructions induce fundamentally different perceptions regarding entitlement. Behavior is affected accordingly,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915458
A well-known theoretical result in the contest literature is that greater heterogeneity decreases performance of contestants because of the “discouragement effect.” Leveling the playing field by favoring weaker contestants through bid-caps and favorable tie-breaking rules can reduce the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986649
This paper experimentally investigates how monetary incentives and emotions influence behaviour in a two-player power-to-take game. In this game, one player can claim any part of the other's endowment (take rate), and the second player can respond by destroying his or her own endowment. We focus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992607
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316350
trust are traits that explain permanent differences in the short-run volatility of public goods provision …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012927572
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011657018
In public good games, voluntary contributions tend to start off high and decline as the game is repeated. If high contributors are matched, however, contributions tend to stay high. We propose a formalization predicting that high contributors will self-select into groups committed to charitable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095928
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003293753
Using a laboratory experiment, we present first evidence that stigmatization through public exposure causally reduces the take-up of an individually beneficial transfer. Our design exogenously varies the informativeness of the take-up decision by varying whether transfer eligibility is based on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952402