Showing 1 - 10 of 32
We study the efficient allocation of spending and taxation authority in a federation in which federal politicians are exposed to electoral uncertainty. We show that centralization may, but need not, result in a loss of electoral accountability. We identify an important asymmetry between positive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144284
This paper uses variation in the timing of the Mexican antipoverty program's introduction across municipalities to identify its impact on the share of votes for the local incumbent party. Evidence is found that voters reward the mayor's party for the central benefit to their constituencies,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011289331
We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198494
What explains significant variation across countries in the use of vote buying instead of campaign promises to secure voter support? This paper explicitly models the tradeoff parties face between engaging in vote buying and making campaign promises, and explores the distributional consequences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521218
Results from a new experiment shed light on the effects of voter information on vote buying and incumbent advantage. The treatment provided voters with information about a major spending program and the proposed allocations and promises of mayoral candidates just prior to municipal elections. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011521266
series of laboratory experiments, as we observe convergence to the Nash equilibrium values at the aggregate as well as the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009271606
problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and … democratic elections. An information market is used to predict the long-term performance of a policy, while threshold contracts …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130416
Rational choice theories of electoral participation stress that an individual's decision to vote depends on her expected net benefit from doing so. If this instrumental motive is relevant, then turnout should be higher in elections where more is at stake. We test this prediction, by studying how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138026
Random factors such as bad weather or exogenous economic shocks affect the re-election of politicians and can reduce accountability. Such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government. Contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems, this study shows that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013156040
Party performance in state and federal elections is highly interdependent. Federal elections impact regional voting … state of Berlin and the federal level in Germany. State voting intentions for the state and for the federal parliament are … federal parliament voting intention impact state parliament voting intention, but – as a new finding – to the same extent also …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012960098