We investigate the dynamics of prices, information and expectations in a competitive, noisy, dynamic asset pricing equilibrium model with long-term investors. We argue that the fact that prices can score worse or better than consensus opinion in predicting the fundamentals is a product of...

We show that dealers' limited market participation, coupled with an informational friction resulting from lack of market transparency, can make liquidity demand upward sloping, inducing strategic complementarities: traders demand more liquidity when the market becomes less liquid, fostering...

In a standard financial market model with asymmetric information with a finite number N of risk-averse informed traders, competitive rational expectations equilibria provide a good approximation to strategic equilibria as long as N is not too small: equilibrium prices in each situation converge...

We consider a two-period market with persistent liquidity trading and risk averse privately informed investors who have a one period horizon. With persistence, prices reflect average expectations about fundamentals and liquidity trading. Informed investors engage in “retrospective” learning...

In a standard financial market model with asymmetric information with a finite number N of risk-averse informed traders, competitive rational expectations equilibria provide a good approximation to strategic equilibria as long as N is not too small: equilibrium prices in eachsituation converge...

We investigate the dynamics of prices, information and expectations in a competitive, noisy, dynamic asset pricing equilibrium model with long-term investors. We argue that the fact that prices can score worse or better than consensus opinion in predicting the fundamentals is a product of...

We consider a two-period market with persistent liquidity trading and risk averse privately informed investors who have a one period horizon. With persistence, prices reflect average expectations about fundamentals and liquidity trading. Informed investors engage in “retrospective” learning...