This paper investigates the influence of industrial relations on firm wage premia in Germany. OLS regressions for the firm effects from a two-way fixed effects decomposition of workers’ wages by Card, Heining, and Kline (2013) document that average premia are larger in firms bound by...

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....

When enacting labor market regulation governments face courts that interpret and implement the legal code. We show that the incentives for governments for labor market reform increase with the uncertainty that is involved in the implementation of legal codes through courts. Given that judges...

We study the various consequences of and the incentives for outsourcing. We argue that the wage elasticity of labour demand increases as a function of the share of outsourcing, which is a result consistent with existing empirical research. Furthermore, we show that a production mode with a...

This paper analyses the link between political strength and public sector wages using a unique matched individual-employer data set for Norwegian local governments during the period 1990-1998. The results indicate that political strength, measured in several ways, has a positive effect on wages,...

It has been noted that the search and matching model cannot account for the observed unemployment fluctuations. Gertler and Trigari (2009) show this weakness of the model disappears when wage stickiness is introduced to the model. Pissarides (2009) disagrees with this modification, arguing that...

We analyze the questions associated with flexible outsourcing both with committed and flexible profit sharing under imperfect domestic labour markets. How does profit sharing influence flexible outsourcing? What is the relationship between outsourcing cost, profit sharing and equilibrium...