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The Political Economy of International Organizations

Dreher, Axel - 2016

We review the literature on the political economy of international organizations (IOs). Considering IOs as products of the preferences of various actors rather than monolithic entities we focus on national politicians, international bureaucrats, interest groups, and voters. By looking into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012980581

Political Booms, Financial Crises

Herrera, Helios - 2014

We show that political booms, measured by the rise in governments' popularity, predict financial crises above and beyond other better-known early warning indicators, such as credit booms. This predictive power, however, only holds in emerging economies. We show that governments in emerging...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047326

IMF Surveillance and Financial Markets - A Political Economy Analysis

Fratzscher, Marcel - 2014

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013069721

Geopolitics, Aid and Growth

Dreher, Axel - 2013

We investigate the effects of short-term political motivations on the effectiveness of foreign aid. Donor countries' political motives might reduce the effectiveness of conditionality, channel aid to inferior projects or affect the way aid is spent in other ways, reduce the aid bureaucracy's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013079379

The Political Economy of Financial Systems : Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries

Degryse, Hans - 2014

Initially, voting rights were limited to wealthy elites providing political support for stock markets. The franchise expansion induces the median voter to provide political support for banking development as this new electorate has lower financial holdings and benefits less from the uncertainty...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060987

The Costs of Favoritism : Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?

Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2021

World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316223

Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data

Dreher, Axel; Gassebner, Martin; Siemers, Lars H.R - 2021

The paper presents a political economy model linking terror and governments' respect for human rights. Using panel data for 111 countries over the period 1973-2002, we then empirically analyze whether and to what extent terror affects human rights - measured by three indices covering a wide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317184

The Customs Union Issue : Why Do We Observe so Few of Them?

Facchini, Giovanni - 2012

The number of preferential trade agreements has greatly increased over the past two decades, yet most existing bilateral arrangements take the form of free trade areas, and less than ten percent can be considered to be fully fledged customs unions. This paper develops a political economy model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012755036

Voting in Hiring Committees : Which 'Almost' Rule is Optimal?

Baharad, Eyal - 2018

We determine the scoring rule that is most likely to select a high-ability candidate. A major result is that neither the widely used plurality rule nor the inverse-plurality rule are ever optimal, and that the Borda rule is hardly ever optimal. Furthermore, we show that only the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012924991

Majority Vote on Educational Standards

Schwager, Robert - 2018

The direct democratic choice of an examination standard, i.e., a performance level required to graduate, is evaluated against a utilitarian welfare function. It is shown that the median preferred standard is inefficiently low if the marginal cost of reaching a higher performance reacts more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012925249