Showing 1 - 10 of 1,860
This paper evaluates differential prize taxation and structural discrimination as a means of increasing efforts in the most widely studied contests. We establish that a designer who maximizes efforts subject to a balanced-budget constraint prefers dual discrimination, namely, change of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013105142
We revisit the classical result that financing a pure public good through taxation of private consumption is inefficient. To this standard setup we add a consumption contest in which consumers can win a prize. We show that an appropriately chosen contest — which we call a ‘tax lottery' —...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013082023
This paper shows that households with positional concerns and convex status utility use gambling to attempt … results strongly indicate that households who care about status are more likely to participate in gambling and invest more in … gambling, while they save less. In addition, results regarding socio-economic and demographic characteristics are reported. For …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013083874
We provide a solution to the free-rider problem in the provision of a public good. To this end we define a biased indirect contribution game which provides the efficient amount of the public good in non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. No confiscatory taxes or other means of coercion are used. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086449
Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (2006), based upon simple lottery preference. This article show how the mathematics of lattice theory …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013043176
When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources - the so-called...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043494
This paper studies a contracting problem where agents' cost of actions is private information. With two actions, this leads to a two-dimensional screening problem with moral hazard. There is a natural one-dimensional ordering of types when there is both adverse selection and moral hazard....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947518
We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The industry consists of a polluting firm with private information about its production technology. Implementing a transfer-based regulation policy requires the government to make...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012949241
We analyse a principal-agent relationship in the context of international climate policy. Principals in two countries first decide whether to merge domestic emission permit markets to an international market, then delegate the domestic permit supply to an agent. We find that principals select...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952407
This paper experimentally examines the selection of equilibria in dynamic games. Our baseline treatment is a two-state extension of an indefinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, which we modify in series of treatments to study the focality of efficiency and symmetry, the effect dynamic and static...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013019850