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Is Emission Intensity or Output U-Shaped in the Strictness of Environmental Policy?
Dijkstra, Bouwe - 2014
In a model where firms face a continuous choice of how much to invest in environmental innovation, we show that an ever stricter environmental policy does not always lead to ever cleaner production methods and ever lower production of polluting goods. It does so when the abatement technology is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051606
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Voluntary Emission Reductions, Social Rewards, and Environmental Policy
Rauscher, Michael - 2021
Social norms and intrinsic motivations lead to environmentally friendly behaviour even in the absence of environmental policy. This paper looks at the interactions of social norms and environmental regulation in their impact on individual behaviour. People obtain social rewards for voluntary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317346
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Punishment - And Beyond
Frey, Bruno S. - 2021
This paper argues that the “Economics of Crime” concentrates too much on punishment as a policy to fight crime, which … is unwise for several reasons. There are important instances in which punishment simply cannot reduce crime. Several … feasible alternatives to punishment exist, such as offering positive incentives or handing out awards for law abiding behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316343
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Self-Enforcing Environmental Agreements and International Trade
Eichner, Thomas - 2013
In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013086051
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Compliance Dynamics Generated by Social Interaction Rules
Lipatov, Vilen - 2021
We study compliance dynamics generated by a large set of behavioral rules describing social interaction in a population of agents facing an enforcement authority. When the authority adjusts the auditing probability every period, cycling in cheating-auditing occurs: Intensive monitoring induces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315606
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Endogenous Monopsony and the Perverse Effect of the Minimum Wage in Small Firms
Danziger, Leif - 2021
The minimum wage rate has been introduced in many countries as a means of alleviating the poverty of the working poor. This paper shows, however, that an imperfectly enforced minimum wage rate causes small firms to face an upward-sloping labor supply schedule. Since this turns these firms into...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316334
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The Interaction of Legal and Social Norm Enforcement
Kube, Sebastian - 2010
Although legal sanctions are often non-deterrent, we frequently observe compliance with ‘mild laws'. A possible explanation is that the incentives to comply are shaped not only by legal, but also by social sanctions. This paper employs a novel experimental approach to study the link between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142143
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Monitoring, Sanctions and Front-Loading of Job Search in a Non-Stationary Model
Cockx, Bart - 2011
We develop and estimate a non-stationary job search model to evaluate a scheme that monitors job search effort and sanctions insured unemployed whose effort is deemed insufficient. The model reveals that such schemes provide incentives to the unemployed to front-load search effort prior to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117785
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Status-Seeking in Criminal Subcultures and the Double Dividend of Zero-Tolerance
Dur, Robert - 2006
This paper offers a new argument for why a more aggressive enforcement of minor offenses ('zero-tolerance') may yield a double dividend in that it reduces both minor offenses and more severe crime. We develop a model of criminal subcultures in which people gain social status among their peers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012779694
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When and How the Punishment Must Fit the Crime
Mailath, George J.; Nocke, Volker; White, Lucy - 2021
In repeated normal-form (simultaneous-move) games, simple penal codes (Abreu, 1986, 1988) permit an elegant characterization of the set of subgame-perfect outcomes. We show that the logic of simple penal codes fails in repeated extensive-form games. By means of examples, we identify two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315551