Similar Search Results

Emotion at Stake : The Role of Stake Size and Emotions in a Power-To-Take Game Experiment in China with a Comparison to Europe

Bosman, Ronald - 2016

responder has over his or her actions via emotion regulation. Finally, comparing our data with existing data for countries in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992607

Reciprocity and Emotions When Reciprocators Know Each Other

Reuben, Ernesto; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 2021

This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a take authority is matched with two responders. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much of the endowment of each responder that is left after the second stage will be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319064

Bracelets of Pride and Guilt? An Experimental Test of Self-Signaling in Charitable Giving

van der Weele, Joel J. - 2014

Self-signaling theory argues that individuals partly behave prosocially to create or uphold a favorable self-image. To … study self-signaling theory, we investigate whether increasing self-image concerns affects charitable giving. In our … experiment subjects divide 20 euros between themselves and a charity. Some randomly determined participants are induced to wear a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056823

Frustration and Anger in Games

Battigalli, Pierpaolo - 2015

Frustration, anger, and aggression have important consequences for economic and social behavior, concerning for example monopoly pricing, contracting, bargaining, traffic safety, violence, and politics. Drawing on insights from psychology, we develop a formal approach to exploring how...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013024731

Game Form Misconceptions Do Not Explain the Endowment Effect

Bartling, Björn - 2014

We test the claim that game form misconception among subjects making choices through the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) value elicitation procedure provides an explanation for the endowment effect, as suggested by Cason and Plott (forthcoming). We employ a design that allows us to clearly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040481

Mine, Ours and Yours? Unintended Framing Effects in Dictator Games

Bergh, Andreas - 2018

This paper reports results from a classroom dictator game comparing the effects of three different sets of standard instructions. The results show that seemingly small differences in instructions induce fundamentally different perceptions regarding entitlement. Behavior is affected accordingly,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012915458

Gender Effects in Dictator Game Giving : Women Favour Female Recipients

Baltrusch, Maximilian - 2018

Allowing for a free choice of the recipient's gender in a dictator game (N = 508), we find that women show a substantial gender biased towards females. Adding a charity recipient to the possible choices, the charity becomes the primary recipient and overall transfers increase. Yet, conditioning...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012916352

Disguising Lies - Image Concerns and Partial Lying in Cheating Games

Khalmetski, Kiryl - 2019

We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013)-type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902152

Enforcement of Contribution Norms in Public Good Games with Heterogeneous Populations

Reuben, Ernesto - 2011

Economic and social interaction takes place between individuals with heterogeneous characteristics. We investigate experimentally the emergence and informal enforcement of different contribution norms to a public good in homogeneous and different heterogeneous groups. When punishment is not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013134512

The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

Kovenock, Daniel J.; Roberson, Brian - 2010

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136881