Similar Search Results

Electoral Competition as a Determinant of Fiscal Decentralization

Jametti, Mario - 2011

Fiscal decentralization is high on the agenda in policy fora. This paper empirically investigates the underlying causes … of fiscal decentralization, based on the predictions of a simple political economy model. We argue that the likeliness …, the theory's main insight being that the central government's electoral strength should, all else being equal, decrease …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013120275

Private Monitoring, Collusion and the Timing of Information

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Scott, Troy Joseph - 2015

When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources - the so-called...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014043494

Dispersed Information and the Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations

Grazzini, Jakob - 2016

In the presence of dispersed information, agents may decide to take into account the actions of other agents because of the possible additional information conveyed by these actions. We call the act of using other agents' actions in the individual decision process social learning. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986271

On the Optimal Use of Correlated Information in Contractual Design Under Limited Liability

Danau, Daniel - 2018

Riordan and Sappington (JET, 1988) show that in an agency relationship in which the agent's type is correlated with a public ex post signal, the principal may attain first best (full surplus extraction and efficient output levels) if the agent is faced with a lottery such that each type is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917515

Elections and Market Provision of Information

Bruns, Christian - 2013

Economists usually think that rational voters have little incentives to acquire costly information. We present a theoretical model to show that, in contrast to this widely held belief, rational voters acquire considerable amounts of information if media technology is available because then they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087270

Ex Post Information Rents in Sequential Screening

Krahmer, Daniel - 2014

We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054499

Information Markets, Elections and Contracts

Gersbach, Hans - 2011

Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013130416

Information Aggregation in Democratic Mechanisms

Britz, Volker - 2016

We examine whether and how democratic procedures can achieve socially desirable public good provision in the presence of profound uncertainty about the benefits of public goods, i.e., when citizens are able to identify the distribution of benefits only if they aggregate their private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994342

Optimal Revelation of Life-Changing Information

Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2021

Information about the future may be instrumentally useful, yet scary. For example, many patients shy away from precise genetic tests about their dispositions for severe diseases. They are afraid that a bad test result could render them desperate due to anticipatory feelings. We show that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013315497

Informational Requirements of Nudging

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2015

A nudge is a non-coercive paternalistic intervention that attempts to improve choices by manipulating the framing of a decision problem. As any paternalism, it faces the difficulty of determining the appropriate welfare criterion. We propose a welfare-theoretic foundation for nudging similar in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023118