This paper is based on the model of backward linkages from foreign direct investment (FDI) Lin/Saggi (2003), where the market structure of the final goods sector is represented by a monopoly or Cournot oligopoly, and the supplier sector - by a pure monopoly. We extend this model by examining...

We study how incentives for North-South technology transfers in multinational enterprises are affected by labour market institutions. If workers are collectively organised, incentives for technology transfers are partly governed by firms' desire to curb trade union power. This will affect not...

We analyze a repeated game in which countries are polluting as well as investing in technologies. While folk theorems point out that the first best can be sustained as a subgame-perfect equilibrium when the players are sufficiently patient, we derive the second best equilibrium when they are...

It is believed that market power of the input supplier, charging a linear price, is detrimental for the consumers since it creates the double marginalisation problem. We show that this view may not be true if the final goods producers can adopt strategies to reduce rent extraction by the input...

This paper considers investments in cost-reducing technology in the context of contributions to climate protection. Contributions to mitigating climate change are analyzed in a two-period model where later contributions can be based on better information, but delaying the contribution to the...

We develop a model to analyze one mechanism under which stronger intellectual property rights (IPR) protection may improve the ability of firms in developing countries to break into export markets. A Northern firm with a superior process technology chooses either exports or technology transfer...

We develop a two-sector, two-country model where trade is driven by technological differences. Each country is populated by large number of heterogeneous workers distinguished by their level of skills. Given that one country has a technological advantage in the skilled intensive good when we...