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An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013054012
in an experiment. Our data show that indeed, strengthening weaker contestants through tie-breaks and bid …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986649
This paper reports on experiments testing the viability of markets for cheap talk information. We find that the poor quality of the information transmitted leads to a collapse of information markets. The reasons for this are surprising given the previous experimental results on cheap-talk games....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012917514
laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction has an efficient equilibrium and is revenue equivalent with the second … called the 'chopstick auction' in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We do so both in theory and in a …-price sealed-bid auction in which the exposure problem is not present. In the experiment, however, we find that the 'chopstick …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317485
This paper develops a statistical framework of steady-state identities which enable us to match the distributions of durations found in the micro-data to generalized Taylor and Calvo models of time-dependent pricing. We illustrate the approach with the UK micro CPI data for 2006-2009, and employ...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013316198
This paper analyzes a model of corporate tax competition with repeated interaction and with strategic use of profit shifting within multinationals. We show that international tax coordination is more likely to prevail if the degree of asymmetry in terms of productivity differences between...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125360
I present a two-player nested contest which is a convex combination of two widely studied contests: the Tullock (lottery) contest and the all-pay auction. A Nash equilibrium exists for all parameters of the nested contest. If and only if the contest is sufficiently asymmetric, then there is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098647
This article investigates the impact of the distribution of preferences on equilibrium behavior in conflicts that are modeled as all-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. In this context, we define centrists and radicals using a willingness-to-pay criterion that admits preferences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013106913
We compare two commonly used mechanisms in procurement: auctions and negotiations. The execution of the procurement mechanism is delegated to an agent of the buyer. The agent has private information about the buyer's preferences and may collude with one of the sellers. We provide a precise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089156
We analyze the revenue-enhancing potential of favoring specific contestants in complete information all-pay auctions and lottery contests with several heterogeneous contestants. Two instruments of favoritism are considered: head starts that are added to the bids of specific contestants and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963772