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This paper studies a contracting problem where agents' cost of actions is private information. With two actions, this leads to a two-dimensional screening problem with moral hazard. There is a natural one-dimensional ordering of types when there is both adverse selection and moral hazard....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947518
We develop a methodology to sign output distortions in the random participation framework. We apply our method to monopoly nonlinear pricing problem, to the regulatory monopoly problem and mainly to the optimal income tax problem. In the latter framework, individuals are heterogeneous across two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013108085
We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938445
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060470
requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract so as to realign his interests with those of the principal. The parties … of the optimal flexible contract both when the parties have sharp probabilistic beliefs over the possible events in which … risk aversion, the higher the agency costs for delegation and hence the less profitable is a flexible contract versus a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116425
In the education literature, it is generally acknowledged that both credit and insurance for students are rationed. In order to provide a rationale for these observations, we present a model with perfectly competitive banks and risk averse students who have private information on their ability...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008914272
This paper presents a market with asymmetric information where a privately revealing equilibrium obtains in a competitive framework and where incentives to acquire information are preserved. The equilibrium is efficient, and the paradoxes associated with fully revealing rational expectations...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144882
We consider a model of on-the-job search where firms offer long-term wage contracts to workers of different ability. Firms do not observe worker ability upon hiring but learn it gradually over time. With sufficiently strong information frictions, low-wage firms offer separating contracts and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009293483
We completely characterize the set of second-best optimal “menus”of student-loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans and an elementary optimal income-tax problem à la...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010668475
create externalities among workers, since their utility upon accepting a contract depends on their team’s performance and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010743453